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PREFACE
Task 3 of the Systeni and Ilecision Sciences Area, "Decision .4nalysis
and Conflict Resolution". is devoted, in part. to the study of thc question: what criteria and methods can t~e dcvelopcd for the equitable division of resources or other given quantities among conlpeting interests?
This paper treats a specific problem that has wide application in public sector decision making, namely, the allocation of representation to different parties, regions. or interest groups according to thcir sizc or to some other measure. In the context of allocating scats to parties this is hnown as the proportional rrpresrntation problem.
The paper is dircctly concerned with normative political science. and as such, has policy relcvance t o decision makers respor~sible for determining methods of representation.
The objective of the paper is to analyze various proposed methods of allocation in the light of common-sensr properties, and to make more precise what is meant by a "fair" or "equitable" solutiori. Experience has shown that if political debatc can bc raiscd from a bickering over particular numbers to au agreement on principles, a solution is more likely to be forthcoming.
In an earlirr paper by the authors, Crilrria for l'roportional R e p r e s~n -lation, various reasor~able propcrtit:~ were irltroduced I'or proportional rcpresentation methods, and detailed mathematical arguments were used to show that various of thesc properties could be used t o characterize particular methods. 111 this paper the implications of these results are discussed in depth. Moreover, a new property callecl uniformity is introduced which is shown to have iri~portant implications for charactcrizing classes of proportional representation methods.
The methods and approaches developcd in this paper. and in other allied papers. should prove to be a methodological step towards treating problems of fair division and conflict resolution found in more complcx situations than the one considered here. Thus. this work represents a step in an ongoing program. albeit a step which has imrnediatc relevance t o a problem encountered in many countries. This paper directly addresses the political science community rather than the applied mathematics or systems sciences community. Technical detail is avoided in order to concentrate on normative political issues.
SUMMARY
The following problem arises in many political contexts. A certain number of political "parties" are to split a given number of seats in a legislature according to the numbers of votes they obtained in an election. What principles should determine how these seats are to be allocated? A basic principle dictated by both common sense and historical precedent is "house monotonicity": if the number of seats to be allocated goes up, then, all other faktors being equal. no party's allocation should go down. Another basic prinicple is "uniformity": if two parties of given sizes divide a certain number of seats, then they should always divide this number in the same way. These properties characterize an important class of methods called the Huntington methods. A further property relevant to proportional representation is the tendency of some methods to encourage parties to merge by awarding more seats to the merged party than they would receive separately. (Similarly, some methods encourage schisms by penalizing larger parties.) This property singles out one of the Huntington methods--the so-called Jefferson, or d'Hondt method--as particularly desirable. But a third property, that of "satisfying quota" is violated by the Jefferson method. This recommends for consideration a new method, called the Quota method.
The conclusion is that agreement on the desired principles of proportional representation provides a basis for the rational selection of a method to affect allocations. Thus the axiomatic approach of mathematics provides a normative basis for the design of political systems.
INTRODUCTION T h e r e e x i s t w h o l e s a l e numbers o f p o s s i b l e e l e c t i o n p r o c ed u r e s . A b a s i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t h e s e h a s been made i n t o
" p l u r a l i t y s y s t e m s " and " p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (PR) s y s t e m s " .
I n a p l u r a l i t y s y s t e m a n e l e c t o r u s u a l l y c a s t s o n e v o t e f o r t h e c a n d i d a t e o r t h e ( p a r t y ) l i s t o f c a n d i d a t e s o f h i s o r h e r c h o i c e i n some e l e c t i o n d i s t r i c t , and t h e c a n d i d a t e o r t h e l i s t r e c e i v i n g a m a j o r i t y o r a p l u r a l i t y i s e l e c t e d . Such s y s t e m s a r e b a s e d o n a n o t i o n o f g e o g r a p h i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . M i d -n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y Europe saw an i n c r e a s i n g d i s s a t i s f a ct i o n w i t h p l u r a l i t y s y s t e m s a s u n f a i r t o m i n o r i t i e s , f o r s m a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were e f f e c t i v e l y b a r r e d from h a v i n g any rep r e s e n t a t i o n whenever t h e i r a d h e r e n t s w e r e d i s t r i b u t e d t h r o u g ho u t many single-member e l e c t i o n d i s t r i c t s . T h i s l e d t o t h e i d e a o f p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i c h ,
i n i t s p u r e f o r m , h a s e l e c t o r s c a s t o n e v o t e f o r a p a r t y o r a p a r t y l i s t i n a multimember d i s t r i c t and t h e n , by some r u l e , m e t e s numbers o f s e a t s " p r o p o r t i o n a l l y " among t h e p a r t i e s a cc o r d i n g t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e v o t e t o t a l s .
Of c o u r s e , v a r i a n t s o f b o t h t y p e s o f s y s t e m e x i s t , a s d o complex m i x t u r e s .
T h i s p a p e r f o c u s e s on t h e p u r e form o f t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n problem: v o t e r s c a s t a s i n g l e v o t e f o r a p a r t y i n a multimember d i s t r i c t and t h e q u e s t i o n i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e
j u s t number o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s d u e e a c h p a r t y . E x a c t p r o p o r t i o na l i t y c a n n o t , i n g e n e r a l , b e a c h i e v e d s i n c e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n must be i n t e g r a l . Some " r o u n d i n g " must t a k e p l a c e .
A p p e a r a n c e s t o W e a r g u e t h a t t h e o n l y v a l i d a p p r o a c h t o t h e c o m p a r i s o n of m e t h o d s , and h e n c e t o t h e u l t i m a t e c h o i c e of a method, i s t h r o u g h c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s o f t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s . C o n s i d e r an a r b i t r a r y method o f a l l o c a t i o n M. Does M h a v e t h e p r o p e r t y --o f a l w a y s a s s u r i n g a p a r t y a t l e a s t i t s e x a c t p r o p o r t i o n a l numb e r o f s e a t s rounded down, o r a t most t h a t number o f s e a t s rounded up? Suppose t h a t , w i t h v o t e t o t a l s unchanged, t h e numb e r o f s e a t s i n a p a r l i a m e n t i s i n c r e a s e d :
d o e s t h e method Ma l w a y s a s s u r e e a c h p a r t y a t l e a s t a s much r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a s was a l l o c a t e d t o i t b e f o r e ? Suppose t h a t , i n s t e a d o f s t a n d i n g a l o n e , two p a r t i e s form a c o a l i t i o n which o b t a i n s t h e same v o t e t o t a l a s t h e sum o f t h e v o t e s t h a t would h a v e been r e c e i v e d by t h e p a r t i e s s e p a r a t e l y : d o e s t h e method M g i v e a t l e a s t a s -many s e a t s t o t h e c o a l i t i o n a s t h e sum o f t h e s e a t s M would -h a v e a l l o c a t e d t o t h e p a r t i e s s e p a r a t e l y ? P o s t u l a t e an e l e c t i o n i n which some s u b s e t o f p a r t i e s , e a c h s t a n d i n g a l o n e , i s a l l o -
c a t e d c e r t a i n numbers o f s e a t s by a method M and t h a t t h e y j o i n t --l y h o l d h s e a t s : i f M w e r e u s e d t o a l l o c a t e t h o s e h s e a t s among
o n l y t h e s e p a r t i e s w i t h t h e g i v e n v o t e t o t a l s , would M a r r i v e a t -t h e same a l l o c a t i o n ? I t i s p e r h a p s s u r p r i s i n g --b u t it i s a f a c t --t h a t n o method e n j o y s many o f t h e c o m b i n a t i o n s o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s s u g g e s t e d by t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , t h a t some methods a r e t h e o n l y o n e s w h i c h e n j o y c e r t a i n c o m b i n a t i o n s , and t h a t some o t h e r c o m b i n a t i o n s d e f i n e p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s e s o f methods. Below, we d e s c r i b e t h e fundament a l p r o p e r t i e s o f a l l o c a t i o n methods i n t h e c o n t e x t o f methods o f a l l o c a t i o n which h a v e been a d v a n c e d o v e r t h e y e a r s s i n c e t h e p r o b l e m o f p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f i r s t a r o s e . W e p o i n t t o some i m p o s s i b l e c o m b i n a t i o n s , and c h a r a c t e r i z e two methods which seem p a r t i c u l a r l y a p t f o r PR s y s t e m s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , we i n t r od u c e t h e n o t i o n s o f methods b e i n g s t a b l e , e n c o u r a g i n g c o a l i t i o n s , and e n c o u r a g i n g s c h i s m s . But t h e c h o i c e o f a p p r o p r i a t e p r o p e rt i e s d e p e n d s upon t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , n a t i o n , and h e r i t a g e .
Thus t h e m o r a l o f t h e p a p e r i s : p o l i t i c i a n s s h o u l d n o t c h o o s e n u m e r i c a l s o l u t i o n s , o r e v e n n u m e r i c a l methods.
R a t h e r , t h e y s h o u l d a r g u e t h e merits o f p r o p e r t i e s o f m e t h o d s , and l e t t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n s i n p r i n c i p l e d e t e r m i n e t h e methods and t h u s t h e numbers. Thus, a x i o m a t i z a t i o n f i n d s i t s p o l i t i c a l r o l e .
BACKGROUND L e t u s c o n s i d e r s p a r t i e s , a n d r e p r e s e n t t h e v o t e t o t a l o f e a c h p a r t y i by p i , 1 2 i 2 s. h , a n o n n e g a t i v e i n t e g e r , w i l l b e t h e t o t a l number o f s e a t s t o b e a l l o c a t e d ( c a l l e d t h e house s i z e ) . W e c o n s i d e r o n l y t h o s e p a r t i e s which r e c e i v e v o t e s , s o t h a t pi > 0. F o r a g i v e n h o u s e s i z e h , t h e p r o b l e m i s t o f i n d an a l l o c a t i o n f o r h : namely, s n o n n e g a t i v e i n t e g e r s a l , a 2 , . . . , a s whose sum i s h. A s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Of c o u r s e , g e o g r a p h i c a l a p p o r t i o n m e n t c a n a r i s e i n p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s y s t e m s t o o . ) I n t h i s c a s e t h e numbers p l , p Z , . . . , p s a r e i n t e r p r e t e d a s t h e p o p u l a t i o n ( o r t h e number o f v o t e r s ) i n t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e s , and ai i s t h e number o f s e a t s a l l o c a t e d t o s t a t e i . The a p p o r t i o n m e n t p r o b l e m h a s a l o n g and c o l o r f u l h i s t o r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s [ 1 , 7 , 2 1 1 .
F o r p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h r e e p r i n c i p a l methods s e e m t o h a v e been c o n s i d e r e d : S a i n t e -L a g f i e ' to ask whether the amount of inequality can be reduced by a trans fer of one seat from the better-off party to the less-well-off party. For a given measure an allocation is said to be i n e q u il i b r i u m if no transfer of a representative from a "better off" party to a "worse off" party reduces the amount of inequality between them. Of course, certain conceivable measures may not (and do not) admit equilibrium solutions for all vote-total distributions, but Huntington showed [14, 15] all solutions obtained in the following manner for successive house sizes h. For h = 0, the allocation must be zero for every party. Given that an allocation (al,...,as) has been found for a house size h, an allocation for house size h + 1 is found by giving one more seat to a party k for which pk/d(ak) is a maximum.
I f t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l s t a t e s t h a t a r e t i e d f o r maximum, t h e n s e v e r a l a l l o c a t i o n s may r e s u l t u n l e s s some t i e -b r e a k i n g r u l e i s employed.
The numbers p i / d ( a i ) may b e t h o u g h t o f a s m e a s u r i n g t h e " p r i o r i t y " o f a p a r t y w i t h a i s e a t s t o r e c e i v e o n e more s e a t . T h u s , i f o n e more s e a t i s t o b e d i s t r i b u t e d , t h e n p a r t y i w i l l " d e s e r v e " i t more t h a n p a r t y j i f pi/d ( a i ) > p . / d ( a j ) . I n t h i s c o n t e x t , 3 d ( a i ) may be t h o u g h t o f a s some s o r t o f " w e i g h t i n g " of t h e number o f s e a t s t h a t p a r t y i a l r e a d y h a s .
One o f t h e m o s t commonly u s e d methods f o r p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( e . g . , i n A r g e n t i n a , Belgium, B r a z i l , F i n l a n d , I s r a e l , L i e c h t e n s t e i n , a n d t h e N e t h e r l a n d s [ 1 6 ] ) i s t h a t o f d r H o n d t , a n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y B e l g i a n l a w y e r and p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a d v o c a t e . T h i s method, which was a c t u a l l y f i r s t
p r o p o s e d by Thomas J e f f e r s o n [ l l ] i n 1 9 7 2 , h a s t h e r e f o r e b e e n c a l l e d t h e J e f f e r s o n m e t h o d J [ 7 ] . I n f a c t t h e same method i s known i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e v a r i o u s l y a s t h e method o f " h i g h e s t
a v e r a g e " o r " Z a r 6 p a r t i t i o n ? I Za plus f o r t e m o y e n n e " a n d i s d e s c r i b e d d i f f e r e n t l y , t h o u g h i n f a c t i t l e a d s t o t h e same r e s u l t ( s e e S e c t i o n 4 b e l o w ) . T h a t t h e s e a r e a c t u a l l y a l l d i f f e r e n t methods i s s e e n from t h e example i n T a b l e 2 , where t h e f i v e methods a l l o c a t e 36 s e a t s among s i x p a r t i e s i n f i v e d i f f e r e n t ways. 
The J e f f e r s o n method i s o n e o f t h e f i v e d i v i s o r m e t h o d s s t u d i e d by H u n t i n g t o n , a n d it u s e s t h e d i v i s o r c r i t e r i o n d ( a )
= a + 1.
The r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c r i t e r i o n i s a s f o l l o w s . I f p a r t y i h a s a i s e a t s t h e n p i / a i --t h e number o f v o t e s p e r s e a t --i s a m e a s u r e o f how w e l l -r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t p a r t y c u r r e n t l y i s . I f one more s e a t w e r e a v a i l a b l e f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n , t h e J e f f e r s o n method p r o c e e d s by g i v i n g t h e e x t r a s e a t t o a p a r t y t h a t would be t h e w o r s t -o f f w e r e every p a r t y t o g e t o n e more s e a t , i . e . , by g i v i n g t h e e x t r a s e a t t o a p a r t y k w i t h t h e l a r g e s t pk/ A n o t h e r p l a u s i b l e c r i t e r i o n , one m i g h t a r g u e , would b e t o a l w a y s g i v e t h e " a d d i t i o n a l " s e a t t o t h e p a r t y t h a t i s c u r r e n t l y t h e w o r s t o f f , i -e . , t o t h e p a r t y f o r w h i c h p k / a k i s a maximum. T h i s method i s known i n t h e a p p o r t i o n m e n t l i t e r a t u r e a s t h e

H u n t i n g t o n ' s m e t h o d s , E q u a l P r o p o r t i o n s ( E P ) ,
-was t h e o n e f a v o r e d by H u n t i n g t o n , and i s t h e method c u r r e n t l y u s e d t o a p p o r t i o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
I t i s an i n t e r e s t i n g h i s t o r i c a l n o t e t h a t Sainte-Lagtie [ 2 0 ] came upon t h e W e b s t e r method q u i t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y v i a t h e i d e a o f m i n i m i z i n g a t o t a l measure o f t h e i n e q u a l i t y o f an a l l o c a t i o n .
He p r o p o s e d t h a t an a l l o c a t i o n s h o u l d m i n i m i z e s i n c e i n a p e r f e c t a l l o c a t i o n h/p = ai/pi f o r a l l i . The Webster method p r o v i d e s s o l u t i o n s w h i c h d o t h i s . I n t h e same p a p e r S a i n t e -L a g b e s u g g e s t s i n words ( t h o u g h n o t i n s y m b o l s ) t h a t o n e c o u l d b e i n t e r e s t e d i n m i n i m i z i n g b u t t h a t " o n e i s l e d t o a more complex r u l e " . I n f a c t , t h i s g i v e s p r e c i s e l y t h e method o f E q u a l P r o p o r t i o n s .
T h e r e i s a n o t h e r method t h a t i s o f t e n p r o p o s e d f o r p r o p o rt i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and which i s , s e e m i n g l y , t h e most n a t u r a l o n e .
A l t h o u g h known by s e v e r a l names, i n c l u d i n g " L a ~6~a r t i t i o v i a u p l u s f o r t r e s t p "
and " V i n t o n ' s method o f 1 8 5 0 " , it was app a r e n t l y f i r s t p r o p o s e d by A l e x a n d e r H a m i l t o n [ 2 3 ] i n 1 7 9 2 and h a s t h e r e f o r e been c a l l e
d t h e H a m i l t o n m e t h o d H [ 7 1 .
D e f i n e t h e e x a c t q u o t a o f p a r t y j t o b e q = q j ( e , h ) = j p j h / l i P i ; it i s t h e e x a c t l y p r o p o r t i o n a l number o f s e a t s des e r v e d by p a r t y j and t h e number t h a t o n e would w i s h t o a l l o c a t e t o j w e r e it i n t e g r a l . L e t L q . J d e n o t e t h e l a r g e s t i n t e g e r l e s s I t h a n o r e q u a l t o q . 
I s s e a t t o e a c h o f t h e f i r s t h -l L q j J p a r t i e s on t h e l i s t . I f t h e r e a r e t i e s t h e n t h e r e e x i s t d i s t i n c t a r r a n g e m e n t s o f t h e p r i o r i t y l i s t a n d , h e n c e , p o s s i b l y s e v e r a l s o l u t i o n s . The r a t i o n a l e o f t h e H a m i l t o n method i s t h e f o l l o w i n g . E v e r y p a r t y j c e r t a i n l y d e s e r v e s a number o f s e a t s a t l e a s t e q u a l t o i t s l o w e r q u o t a L q . J , hence we b e g i n by g i v i n g e a c h I p a r t y a t l e a s t t h i s many s e a t s . Any method s u c h t h a t f o r a l l a l l o c a t i o n s a f o r h i s s a i d t o s a t i s f y Zower q u o t a .
By t h e same t o k e n , no p a r t y j d e s e r v e s t o r e c e i v e more t h a n r q . 1 s e a t s (where T q . 1 i s t h e n e x t i n t e g e r l a r g e r t h a n q . o r 3 I 1 i f q . i t s e l f i s i n t e g e r , T q . 1 = q . ) . T q . 1 i s c a l l e d t h e u p p e r I I 3
I q u o t a o f s t a t e j , a n d a method s a t i s f i e s u p p e r q u o t a i f f o r a l l a l l o c a t i o n s a f o r h ,
-.
A method M s a t i s f i e s q u o t a i f it s a t i s f i e s b o t h l o w e r and
u p p e r q u o t a f o r a l l p a r t i e s j and a l l o c a t i o n s a .
I n p a r t i c u l a r , -t h e H a m i l t o n method s a t i s f i e s q u o t a .
The H a m i l t o n m e t h o d , o r m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f i t , i s c u r r e n t l y
u s e d f o r PR i n t h e p a r l i a m e n t s o f C o s t a R i c a and I t a l y [ 1 6 ] , a n d was f o r m e r l y u s e d i n I s r a e l .
Under t h e name o f t h e Vinton msthod of 1850 i t was a l s o u s e d t o a p p o r t i o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from 1850 t o 1900. 
I n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e H a m i l t o n method
i t somewhat h y s t e r i c a l , p o l i t i c i a n ' s r e a c t i o n t o t h e p r o p e r t y . The phenomenon, known a s t h e AZabama paradox, i s n o t a n i s o l a t e d q u i r k o f t h e H a m i l t o n method, b u t o c c u r s f r e q u e n t l y . C o n s i d e r t h e v o t e t o t a l s o f t h e s i x p a r t i e s i n T a b l e 3: p a r t i e s D and E a r e g i v e n a t o t a l o f 10 s e a t s when 37 a r e t o be a l l o c a t e d , b u t o n l y 8 when 38 a r e t o b e a l l o c a t e d . The p o i n t i s n o t t h a t one would n e c e s s a r i l y b e i n a s i t u a t i o n where t h e number o f s e a t s t o b e a l l o c a t e d i n c r e a s e s by 1 --a l t h o u g h h i s t o r y i s r e p l e t e w i t h h o u s e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s which i n c r e a s e t h e i r numbers--but r a t h e r t h a t any method e x h i b i ti n g s u c h b e h a v i o r r u n s t o t a l l y c o n t r a r y t o any n o t i o n o f w h a t a f a i r a n d r e a s o n a b l e method s h o u l d d o . One n e e d o n l y r e f e r t o t h e u n i v e r s a l r e a c t i o n o f s h o c k among p o l i t i c i a n s when t h e e v e n t o c c u r r e d t o gauge t h e poZiticaZ u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f t h e I!amilton method. I t s u s e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s b e e n d e f i n i t e l y aband o n e d . Were a p o l i t i c a l party t o l o s e a s e a t o n l y b e c a u s e t h e t o t a l number o f s e a t s t o b e d i s t r i b u t e d h a d b e e n i n c r e a s e d , a
s i m i l a r h u e and c r y would c e r t a i n l y r e s u l t .
T a b l e 3 . 1 H allocation 38 T h u s , an e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t y f o r a n y f a i r a n d r e a s o n a b l e P R method h J i s t h a t i t b e house monotone, t h a t i s , f o r a n y M-solut i o n f , n o p a r t y must r e c e i v e f e w e r s e a t s i f t h e number o f s e a t s 
I t was t h e s e a r c h f o r h o u s e monotone m e t h o d s t h a t m o t i v a t e d
H u n t i n g t o n , b e g i n n i n g i n t h e e a r l y p a r t o f t h i s c e n t u r y , t o f o r - 
n a p a r l i a m e n t a f t e r a n e l e c t i o n .
R a t h e r , it f o r m s a n u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r a l i n c e n t i v e f o r l a r g e r o r s m a l l e r p a r
t i e s t o form b e f o r e e l e c t i o n s . T h i s t y p e o f i nc e n t i v e i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l r a t h e r t h a n p s y c h o l o g i c a l and c a n n o t b e e x p e c t e d t o b e d i r e c t l y o b s e r v a b l e o r m e a s u r a b l e i n any o n e e l e c t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t c o n s t i t u t e s a n o r m a t i v e b a s i s f o r
t h e d e s i g n o f p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s y s t e m s .
C o n s i d e r a method M a n d a s i t u a t i o n w i t h v o t e t o t a l s p i n --
which some p a r t y h a s p* v o t e s a n d i s a l l o c a t e d a * s e a t s , a n d a n o t h e r p a r t y h a s p v o t e s and i s a l l o c a t e d a s e a t s . Now s u p p o s e t h a t t h e two p a r t i e s merge i n t o o n e p a r t y w i t h a combined v o t e t o t a l p + p*. The method M i s s a i d t o b e s t a b l e i f t h e r e i s a n -M -a l l o c a t i o n o f s e a t s t h a t g i v e s t h e merged p a r t y no more t h a n -a * + a + 1 s e a t s and no l e s s t h a n a * + a -1 s e a t s . The mean-
i n g o f t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s t h a t t h e a l l o c a t i o n s t o p a r t i e s s e p ar a t e l y s h o u l d n o t b e t o o d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t t h e p a r t i e s would
r e c e i v e by m e r g e r , f o r i f t h i s i s n o t t h e c a s e t h e n t h e method i t s e l f may t e n d t o e n c o u r a g e p a r t y m e r g e r s o r s c h i s m s , i . e . , i n s t a b i l i t y .
The f o l l o w i n g r e s u l t may t h e n b e shown [ 3 1 .
(
1) Any d i v i s o r m e t h o d w i t h d i v i s o r c r i t e r i o n d ( a ) s a t i s f y i n g i s s t a b l e .
I t may b e c h e c k e d t h a t t h e f i v e methods o f T a b l e 1 s a t i s f y t h e c o n d i t i o n , h e n c e a l l o f them a r e s t a b l e .
To s e e how s t a b i l i t y w o r k s , c o n s i d e r t h e v o t e t o t a l s o f t h e s i x p a r t i e s i n T a b l e 2 , a n d s u p p o s e t h a t p a r t i e s D and E merge t o form o n e p a r t y .
The J e f f e r s o n method t h e n a c c o r d s t h e merged p a r t y o n e more s e a t t h a n t h e sum o f t h e i r s e p a r a t e a l l oc a t i o n s . 
t e s t o t h e merged p a r t y a t o t a l o f 2 s e a t s l e s s t h a n t h e sum o f t h e i r s e p a r a t e a l l o c a t i o n s (see T a b l e 4 ) .
T h e r e a r e n o n d i v i s o r methods which a r e s t a b l e ; f o r example i t i s p r o v e n i n t h e a p p e n d i x t h a t 
METHODS ENCOURAGING COALITIONS AND METHODS ENCOURAGING SCHISMS F o r p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n it i s i m p o r t a n t t o a s k n o t o n l y w h e t h e r a method i s s t a b l e , b u t a l s o w h e t h e r i t t e n d s t o e n c o u r a g e p a r t i e s t o merge o r t o s p l i n t e r . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e way i n which a method a l l o c a t e s s e a t s may c r e a t e a s u b t l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n c e n t i v e f o r l a r g e r o r s m a l l e r p a r t i e s t o e v o l v e , d e p e n d i n g on w h e t h e r t h e m e r g e r o f p a r t i e s t e n d s t o r e s u l t i n a n e t g a i n o r a n e t l o s s o f s e a t s . F o r p o Z i t i c a Z s t a b i l i t y i t would u s u a l l y b e c o n s i d e r e d d e s i r a b l e t o h a v e m e t h o d s o f a l l o c a t i o n t h a t e n c o u r a g e p a r t i e s t o m e r g e , by a s s u r i n g t h a t t h i s would
n e v e r r e s u l t i n a n e t l o s s o f s e a t s , a n d m i g h t i n f a c t r e s u l t i n a n i n c r e a s e .
To make t h e s e i d e a s p r e c i s e , c o n s i d e r a n y method M a n d any -s i t u a t i o n p i n w h i c h some p a r t y h a s 6 v o t e s a n d i s a l l o c a t e d a -s e a t s by M a n d some o t h e r p a r t y h a s p* v o t e s a n d i s a l l o c a t e d -a * s e a t by M. S u p p o s e t h a t t h e s t a r -and b a r -p a r t i e s merge t o -c r e a t e a p a r t y wit.h a t o t a l o f p * + p v o t e s . We s a y t h a t M e n --courwges c o a Z i t i o n s i f i n any s u c h s i t u a t i o n t h e r e i s an M --a l l o c a t i o n g i v i n g a t l e a s t a * + a s e a t s t o t h e c o a l e s c e d p a r t y . S i m i l a r l y , i f t h e r e i s a n M -a l l o c a t i o n g i v i n g a t most a*+: s e a t s t o t h e c o a l e s c e d p a r t y t h e n M_ i s s a i d t o . / r l i 2 c ' : i i A U L . ' . '
:::?'?.
C o n s i d e r , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e d i v i s o r method w i t h d i v i s o r c r i t e r i o n d ( a ) = a + 6 a p p l i e d f o r 36 s e a t s t o t h e v o t e t o t a l s g i v e n i n T a b l e 2 , and compare t h e r e s u l t w i t h t h a t o f t h e J e f f e r s o n method ( s e e T a b l e 5 ) . I f p a r t i e s B and C merge, t h e n
t h e y r e c e i v e f o u r more s e a t s u n d e r t h e ( a + 6 ) -method, and o n e more u n d e r t h e J e f f e r s o n method. Thus u n d e r b o t h methods t h e r e i s a n i n c e n t i v e f o r p a r t i e s t o merge.
However, t h e ( a + 6 ) -m e t h o d i s u n s t a b l e .
? ? o r e o v e r , i t w i l l b e n o t i c e d t h a t , w h i l e t h e ( a + 6 ) -method w o r k s e v e n more s t r o n g l y t h a n 2 t o e n c o u r a g e c o a l i t i o n s it d o e s s o a t t h e c o s t o f s e r i o u s l y p e n a l i z i n q t h e s r r a l l e r p a r t i e s .
T a b l e 5 . Example o f e n c o u r a a i n g c o a l i t i o n s .
--
Vote Vote t o t a l s t o t a l s Exact Exact
--( a + 6 ) -( a + 6 ) -b e f o r e a f t e r q u o t a s q u o t a s J -s o l . J -s o l . s o l u t i o n s o l u t i o n P a r t y merger merger b e f o r e a f t e r b e f o r e a f t e r b e f o r e a f t e r
T h u s , n o n e o f t h e t h r e e s m a l l e s t p a r t i e s g e t s e v e n i t s l o w e r q u o t a u n d e r t h e ( a + 6 ) -m e t h o d , w h e r e a s a l l o f them d o s o u n d e r $7. -S i n c e any p a r t y c e r t a i n l y h a s a v e r y s t r o n g c l a i m i n e q u i t y t o b e a l l o c a t e d a t l e a s t i t s l o w e r q u o t a , t h e J e f f e r s o n method seems t o b e t h e s u p e r i o r one o f t h e two. I n f a c t , we h a v e t h e f o l l o w i n g r e s u l t . ( 3 ) ?he e i e j ' f e r s o n m e t h o d i s t h e o n l y d i v i s o r m e t h o d t h a t s a t i s l i e s l o w e r q u o t a and e n c o u r z a g e s c o a Z i t i o n s .
T h i s i s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f more g e n e r a l r e s u l t s p r o v e d i n
[ 3 , 6 1 .
Viewed i n t h i s l i g h t t h e J e f f e r s o n method p r e s e n t s s t r o n g c r e d e n t i a l s f o r b e i n g a d o p t e d i n a p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s y s t e m . S a i n t e -L a g f l e a p p e a r s t o h a v e r e a l i z e d t h e t e n d e n c y o f J t o e n c o u r a g e c o a l i t i o n s , b u t h e g a v e n o p r o o f s a n d h i s s t a t ement h a s t h e c u r i o s i t y o f r e f e r r i n g t o a c o m p a r i s o n : " I n compari n g t h e two r u l e s , o n e can show t h a t t h e d l H o n d t r u l e ( J ) f a v o r s
t h e g r o u p i n g o f p a r t i e s w h i c h , by c o a l e s c i n g , may r e c e i v e more s e a t s ; w h e r e a s t h e method o f l e a s t s q u a r e s ( W )
-f a v o r s n e i t h e r g r o u p i n g s n o r s c h i s m s " [ 2 0 , p . 3 7 8 1 . A u n i q u e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f W may, however, be g i v e n i n t e r m s o f i t s " r o u n d i n g " p r o p e r t i e s -( s e e [ 2 1 ) .
The method o f s m a l l e s t d i v i s o r s i s , i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e ,
" s y m m e t r i c " w i t h J .
-Thus we h a v e t h e f o l l o w i n g r e s u l t ( w h i c h i s a l s o a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e o r e m s i n [ 3 , 6 1 . ) .
( 4 ) The m e t h o d o f s m a l l e s t d i v i s o r s i s t h e o n l y divisor m e t h o d t h a t s a t i s f i e s u p p e r q u o t a a n d e n c o u r a g e s s c h i s m s .
UNIFORM EETHODS A "method" o f a l l o c a t i o n b r i n g s t o mind t h e d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n : a s y s t e m a t i c means o r manner o f p r o c e d u r e . I t conv e y s a s e n s e o f r e g u l a r i t y . What i s a v a l i d m a t h e m a t i c a l i n t e rp r e t a t i o n o f t h i s meaning?
Here we i n t r o d u c e and e x p l a i n a n o t i o n which c a p t u r e s t h i s s e n s e .
C o n s i d e r a t w o -p a r t y p r o b l e m i n w h i c h e a c h p a r t y h a s p r ec i s e l y t h e same number o f v o t e s and t h e r e i s a n e v e n number o f s e a t s t o a l l o c a t e . We s a y t h a t a method i s b a l a n c e d i f i t h a s a n a l l o c a t i o n g i v i n g t h e same number o f s e a t s t o e a c h p a r t y . (An e q u i v a l e n t d e f i n i t i o n i s g i v e n i n [ 3 ] . ) I t i s a n o b v i o u s t r u i s m t h a t e v e r y method e v e r p r o p o s e d o r c o n s i d e r e d i s b a l a n c e d . I n t h e s e q u e l we w i l l c o n s i d e r o n l y b a l a n c e d m e t h o d s --e x c e p t t o p o i n t t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f " u n b a l a n c e d " o n e s --and s o w i l l d r o p a n y f u r t h e r ( r e d u n d a n t ) m e n t i o n o f t h i s p r o p e r t y . D i v i s o r methods (which a r e o f c o u r s e b a l a n c e d ) a r e h o u s e monotone. But t h e y a l s o h a v e a n o t h e r p r o p e r t y --" u n i f o r m i t y u --which i s a l o g i c a l t r a n s c r i p t i o n o f t h e i n t u i t i v e n o t i o n o f " m e t h o d " . C o n s i d e r t h e a l l o c a t i o n p r o b l e m o f T a b l e 2 , and s u pp o s e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t t h e p r o b l e m i s m o d i f i e d a s f o l l o w s : p a r t i e s E and F a r e d i s q u a l i f i e d , s o t h e t o t a l v o t e i s 8 7 , 4 8 3 a n d t h e r e a r e 32 s e a t s a m o n g s t t h e r e m a i n i n g s t a t e s .
I f t h e W e b s t e r method W w e r e now u s e d t o a l l o c a t e a h o u s e o f 3 2 s e a t s t o p a r t i e s A , B , C, and D , t h e n o n e would n a t u r a l l y e x p e c t t h a t t h e number o f s e a t s w o u l d b e e x a c t l y t h e same a s t h o s e i n T a b l e 2 , n a m e l y , 1 0 , 9 , 8 , a n d 5 , r e s p e c t i v e l y . ---." -a l s o a n M -a l l o c a t i o n f o r (p,ql ) .
T h a t i s , d r o p p i n g c e r t a i n p a r t i e s a n d t h e s e a t s a l l o c a t e d t o t h e m s h o u l d n o t c h a n g e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s e a t s among t h e p a r t i e s t h a t r e m a i n . The s o l u t i o n m i g h t b e s a i d t o b e " s e c e s s i o n -p r o o f " . One a c t u a l l y would e x p e c t more o f a " m e t h o d " : w h e n e v e r f o u r p a r t i e s h a v i n g t h e v o t e t o t a l s o f A , B , C , a n d D a r e t o s h a r e 32 s e a t s among t h e m , t h e n t h e s e s e a t s s h o u l d a l w a y s b e s h a r e d i n t h e same way ( e x c e p t a l l o w i n g f o r t i e s ) . T h i s e x p e c t a t i o n o f " u n i f o r m i t y " i s f u l f i l l e d b y t h e W e b s t e r m e t h o d , a l l d i v i s o r m e t h o d s a n d , i n f a c t , by a v a s t l y l a r q e r c l a s s o f m e t h o d s .
To b e m a t h e m a t i c a l l y p r e c i s e , c o n s i d e r a n a r b i t r a r y method M a n d t w o d i f f e r e n t p r o b l e m s w i t h v o t e t o t a l s ( p , q ) a n d ( p , q l ) , ---e a c h p r o b l e m c o n t a i n i n g a s e t o f p a r t i e s w i t h i d e n t i c a l v o t e t o t a l s p . S u p p o s e t h a t ( a , b ) i s a n M -a l l o c a t i o n f o r ( p , q ) , t h a t
-
Not a l l m e t h o d s a r e u n i f o r m : t h e H a m i l t o n m e t h o d i s n o t . F o r , c o n s i d e r t h e e x a m p l e o f T a b l e 3. T h e H a m i l t o n m e t h o d u n i q u e l y d i v i d e s 10 s e a t s among D, E , and F by t h e a l l o c a t i o n
( 5 , 4 , 1 ) i n o n e i n s t a n c e (when t h e t o t a l h o u s e i s 3 6 ) , w h e r e a s i t u n i q u e l y a l l o c a t e s t h e m ( 6 , 3 , 1 ) i n a n o t h e r i n s t a n c e (when t h e
t o t a l h o u s e i s 3 9 ) . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , d i v i s o r m e t h o d s a r e u n i f o r m ( s e e ( 6 ) b e l o w ) s i n c e t h e y p r o c e e d by c o m p a r i n g t h e p r i o r i t i e s o f p a r t i e s p a i r by p a i r t h r o u g h e v a l u a t i o n o f p / d ( a ) , s o t h e o r d e r i n a s s i g n i n g s e a t s t o a s u b s e t o f p a r t i e s n e e d n o t c h a n g e i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f o t h e r p a r t i e s . T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n i mm e d i a t e l y s u g g e s t s a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n .
L e t r ( p , a ) b e a n y r e a l -v a l u e d f u n c t i o n o f two r e a l v a r i a b l e s c a l l e d a r a v k in ye^ ( p o s s i b l y i n c l u d i n g ' f o r c e r t a i n v a l u e s o f p a and a ) . G i v e n a r a n k i n d e x , a ( q e n e r a l i z e d )
l )~t i ?~(~t J ? ) m e t h o d [ 3 ] o f a l l o c a t i o n M i s t h e s e t o f a l l s o l u t i o n s f o b t a i n e d
--r e c u r s i v e l y a s f o l l o w s :
i s a n M -a l l o c a t i o n f o r h , a n d k i s some o n e p a r t y f o r w h i c h
-1 -S i n c e we c o n s i d e r o n l y b a l a n c e d m e t h o d s , we m u s t h a v e r ( p , a -1) 2 r ( p , a ) f o r a l l p a n d a , b e c a u s e o t h e r w i s e a n a l l o c a t
i o n t o t h e t w o -p a r t y p r o b l e m ( p , p ) o f f o r m ( a -l , a + l ) w o u l d r e s u l t . H u n t i n gt o n m e t h o d s a r e a d i r e c t g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f d i v i s o r m e t h o d s a n d
a r e h o u s e monotone a n d u n i f o r m f o r t h e same r e a s o n s .
They a dm i t a l o c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f a l l o c a t i o n s . ( 5 ) a i s a n a l l o c a t i o n f o r t h e H u n t i n g t o n m e t h o d M b a s e d
T h i s i s i m m e d i a t e by d e f i n i t i o n . I t a p p l i e s t o d i v i s o r m e t h o d s ;
t h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , a i s a J e f f e r s o n a l l o c a t i o n i f a n d o n l y i f -
One a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s r e s u l t i s t o show t h a t v a r i o u s m e t h o d s t h a t g o by d i f f e r e n t names a n d d e s c r i p t i o n s i n t h e l i te r a t u r e a r e a c t u a l l y t h e same m e t h o d . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e m e t h o d o f l a r 6 p a r t i t i o n 2 l a p l u s f o r t e rnoyenne --u s u a l l y a s c r i b e d t o d ' H o n d t --h a s t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i p t i o n [17]. F i r s t , g i v e t o e z c h s t a t e i t s l o w e r q u o t a Lpih/pJ = a i ; t h e number o f s e a t s r e m a i n i n g t o b e d i s t r i b u t e d i s t h e n h -Ciai. F o r t h e s e r e m a i ni n g s e a t s , p r o c e e d a s f o r J , ( t h a t i s , a s f o r t h e H u n t i n g t o n
m e t h o d w i t h r ( p , a ) = p / ( a + l ) . B u t t h i s m u s t g i v e e x a c t l y t h e same a n s w e r a s J , s i n c e a s we have n o t e d above ( But e x a c t l y t h e same i d e a was p r o p o s e d by Thomas J e f f e r s o n i n a l e t t e r t o G e o r g e W a s h i n g t o n n e a r l y a c e n t u r y e a r l i e r ( 1 7 9 2 ) :
" f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h e r e c a n be n o s u c h common r a t I a n s w e r t h e n .. T h a t H u n t i n g t o n methods c o n s t i t u t e a v e r y g e n e r a l c l a s s may be s e e n from t h e f o l l o w i n g r e s u l t ( w h i c h f o l l o w s from ( 7 ) b e l o w and t h e main t h e o r e m o f [ 4 ] ) .
. t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s [ m u s t be d i v i d e d ] a s nearZy a s t h e n e a r e s t r a t i o w i l l a d m i t ; and t h e f r a c t i o n s
( 6 ) A ( b a l a n c e d ) M i s h o u s e monotone and u n i f o r m i f and -o n l y i f i t i s a H u n t i n g t o n method b a s e d o n c r a n k i n d e x r ( p , a ) w h i c h i s n o n i n c r e a s i n g i n a .
House m o n o t o n i c i t y and u n i f o r m i t y a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o i m p l y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a r a n k i n d e x r ( p , a ) . T h i s i s a s t r o n g i m p l i c a t i o n .
I t p e r m i t s a h o s t o f p e r t i n e n t c o n c l u s i o n s . I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d
t h a t t h e r e e x i s t r a t h e r d u b i o u s n o n -b a l a n c e d H u n t i n g t o n methods c h a r a c t e r i z e d by r a n k i n d i c e s s u c h a s r ( p , a ) = a / p : t h i s method g i v e s a l l s e a t s t o t h e p a r t y w h i c h r e c e i v e s t h e f i r s t s e a t .
The s t a t e m e n t ( 6 ) p e r m i t s a s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f some o f t h e p r e v i o u s r e s u l t s . Thus ( 3 ) c a n b e s t a t e d : t h e r e i s e x a c t l y one u n i f o r m , h o u s e monotone method s a t i s f y i n g l o w e r q u o t a a n d e n c o u r a g i n g c o a l i t i o n s , n a m e l y , t h e J e f f e r s o n method.
And ( 4 ) c a n b e r e f o r m u l a t e d : t h e r e i s e x a c t l y o n e u n i f o r m , h o u s e monot o n e method s a t i s f y i n g u p p e r q u o t a a n d e n c o u r a g i n g s c h i s m s , n a m e l y , t h e method o f s m a l l e s t d i v i s o r s .
T h e r e i s a n o t h e r way of v i e w i n g u n i f o r m i t y . C o n s i d e r a n a r b i t r a r y h o u s e monotone method M. 
w i t h h + 1 s e a t s , g i v e n t h e a l l o c a t i o n f o r a h o u s e w i t h h s e a t s ; t h a t i s , a l l t h a t i s n e e d e d t o b e known i s which s t a t e h a s p r i o r i t y i n r e c e i v i n g t h e n e x t s e a t . An a r b i t r a r y method M i s c o n s i s t e n t i f t h e d e c i s i o n a s t o which p a r t y o f any p a i r most d e s e r v e s t h e e x t r a s e a t when t h e h o u s e s i z e i s i nc r e a s e d by 1, d e p e n d s upon o n l y t h e v o t e t o t a l s and t h e s e a t s a l r e a d y a l l o c a t e d t o t h o s e p a r t i e s s i n g l y , a n d n o t on any o t h e r d a t a ( s u c h a s t h e h o u s e s i z e , number o f o t h e r p a r t i e s , o r v o t e t o t a l s o f o t h e r p a r t i e s ) .
The example o f T a b l e 3 shows t h a t t h e H a m i l t o n method i s n o t c o n s i s t e n t . P a r t i e s D and E r e c e i v e 5 and 3 s e a t s , r e s p e c t i v e l y , f o r h = 35 and h = 38, b u t u n i q u e l y r e c e i v e 5 and 4 f o r h = 36 and u n i q u e l y 6 and 3 f o r h = 39.
Howe v e r , i t i s i m m e d i a t e l y c l e a r t h a t a l l H u n t i n g t o n methods a r e c o n s i s t e n t . I n d e e d , c o n s i s t e n c y a n d u n i f o r m i t y a r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same: U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,
T h e r e i s n o u n i f o r m , h o u s e m o n o t o n e m e t h o d w h i c h s a t i s f i e s q u o t a .
I f a m e t h o d i s h o u s e m o n o t o n e a n d u n i f o r m t h e n it i s a H u n t i n g t o n m e t h o d (see A p p e n d i x ) . B u t t h e J e f f e r s o n m e t h o d i s t h e o n l y H u n t i n g t o n m e t h o d t h a t s a t i s f i e s l o w e r q u o t a a n d t h e m e t h o d o f s m a l l e s t d i v i s o r s i s t h e o n l y m e t h o d t h a t s a t i s f i e s u p p e r q u o t a [ 6 , 7 ] . S i n c e t h e s e m e t h o d s a r e d i f f e r e n t , t h e r e c a n b e no u n if o r m , h o u s e m o n o t o n e m e t h o d s a t i s f y i n g q u o t a . QUOTATONE METHODS
T h r e e p r o p e r t i e s a p p e a r t o d o m i n a t e i n i m p o r t a n c e --h o u s e m o n o t o n i c i t y , u n i f o r m i t y , a n d s a t i s f y i n g q u o t a --b u t t h e y c a n n o t b e s a t i s f i e d by a n y o n e m e t h o d . T h i s r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n : i s t h e r e some " m i n i m a l " w e a k e n i n g o f t h e s e c o n d
i t i o n s w h i c h a d m i t s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a m e t h o d ?
The n e e d f o r h o u s e m o n o t o n i c i t y h a s a l r e a d y b e e n demon--s t r a t e d .
A l l o c a t i o n s w h i c h d o n o t s a t i s f y q u o t a --t h a t i s , w h i c h a r e n o t t h e r e s u l t o f r o u n d i n g t h e e x a c t p r o p o r t i o n a l
s h a r e o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n d u e t o a p a r t y e i t h e r u p a n d d o w n --s e e m t o v i o l a t e common s e n s e a n d h a v e p r o v e n t o b e p o l i t i c a l l y subj e c t t o a t t a c k ( s e e , f o r e x a m p l e , [ 1 9 , 2 4 ] . A p a r t y r e c e i v i n g 40 s e a t s when i t s p r o p o r t i o n a l s h a r e i s 3 7 . 3 4 seems u n r e a s o n a b l y w e l l s e r v e d ; i f i t s t r u e s h a r e w e r e i n s t e a d 4 3 . 3 4 i t s l e a d e r s h i p w o u l d j u s t i f i a b l y c o m p l a i n . S a t i s f y i n g q u o t a seems e s s e n t i a l .
N o t e t h a t a n y m e t h o d s a t i s f y i n g q u o t a i s a l m o s t s t a b l e i n t h e s e n s e t h a t i f a n y t w o p a r t i e s w i t h a * a n d a c o a l e s c e , t h e n t h e c o a l e s c e d p a r t y r e c e i v e s b s e a t s w h e r e a * + a -2 5 -b 5 -a * + a + 2.
G i v e n t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o a t t e m p t t o
weaken t h e u n i f o r m i t y o r c o n s i s t e n c y c o n d i t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , we s a y t h a t a m e t h o d 2 i s q u o t a c o n s i s t e n t i f i t i s c o n s i s t e n t s u b j e c t t o t h e n e e d t o s a t i s f y u p p e r q u o t a , t h a t i s , c o n s i s t e n t u n l e s s t h i s i m p e r a t i v e i s i n c o n f l i c t w i t h s a t i s f y i n g u p p e r q u o t a , i n w h i c h c a s e i t c e d e s t o t h e l a t t e r s t r o n g e r i m p e r a t i v e .
T h e n , i t c a n b e a f f i r m e d ( [ 1 , 7 ] ) . ( i i ) L e t a i = f i ( e , h ) b e a n a l l o c a t i o n f o r h a n d l e t E ( h + l ) b e t h e s e t o f p a r t i e s w h i c h c a n b e g i v e n a n e x t r a s e a t w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g u p p e r q u o t a a t h o u s e s i z e h + 1. I f k c E ( h + l ) i s some o n e p a r t y f o r w h i c h pk ( a k + 1) , -p i / ( a i + 1) f o r a l l i E E ( h + l ) t h e n S t a t e m e n t ( 9 ) g i v e s p o w e r f u l r e a s o n s f o r a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e q u o t a m e t h o d Q i n p r o b l e m s o f p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n -p r a c t i c e o n e f i n d s t h a t Q h a s a t e n d e n c y t o p r o d u c e s o l u t i o n s -t h a t r o u n d u p t h e e x a c t q u o t a s o f l a r g e p a r t i e s more o f t e n t h a n t h o s e o f s m a l l p a r t i e s .
( 9 ) T h e r e e x i s t s a u n i q u e a l l o c a t i o n m e t h o d Q , t h e q u o t a -m e t h o d , t h a t i s h o u s e mono t o n e , q u o t a c o n s i s t e n t , and s a t i s f i e s q u o t a .
The q u o t a m e t h o d Q i s r e l a t e d t o t h e
T h i s seems r e a s o n a b l e f o r t h e a p p l i c at i o n o f Q t o p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s y s t e m s i n t h a t it i n --f e r e n t i a l l y a s k s f o r a " l a r g e " v o t e b e f o r e a c c o r d i n g a n y r e p r es e n t a t i o n a t a l l . N o t i c e , h o w e v e r , t h a t n o l a r g e p a r t y i s a llowed more s e a t s t h a n i t s u p p e r q u o t a . I n a h o u s e h = 0 a l l p a r t i e s h a v e no r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
Given a n a l l o c a t i o n -
a f o r h , t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s p e c i f i e s a s e t o f p a r t i e s w h i c h -a r e " e l i g i b l e " t o r e c e i v e a n e x t r a s e a t , e l i g i b l e meaning t h a t t h i s c a n be done i n a manner which w i l l g u a r a n t e e q u o t a a n d h o u s e m o n o t o n i c i t y . Some c h o i c e mechanism ( e . g . , a r a n k i n d e x ) c a n b e imposed t o d e t e r m i n e w h i c h p a r t y r e c e i v e s t h e s e a t a t h + 1 i f t h e r e i s more t h a n o n e e l i g i b l e p a r t y . The d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t t h e s e t o f e l i g i b l e p a r t i e s h a s no r a t i o n a l d i r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o t h e r t h a n t h a t j u s t g i v e n , a n d t h a t i t s compu- p r o p e r t i e s a r e e q u i t a b l e f o r t h e s i t u a t i o n a t h a n d . T h i s a n a l y s i s commends one o f two methods: t h e q u o t a method Q , o r t h e J e f f e r s~n -method J .
-
The J e f f e r s o n method c l a i m s r e c o g n i t i o n b e c a u s e i t i s h o u s e m o n o t o n e , u n i f o r m , g u a r a n t e e s l o w e r q u o t a , a n d e n c o u r a g e s We f i r s t p r o v e t h a t t h e H a m i l t o n method i s s t a b l e ( s e e ( 2 ) ) C o n s i d e r any two p a r t i e s , s a y i = 1 , 2 , and s u p p o s e t h a t i n a p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m p a r t y i h a s a n e x a c t q u o t a qi = n . + ri , n . > 0 and i n t e g e r , and 0 ( r . < 1, and l e t a . b e I f r l , r 2 > 0 t h e n i t must be t h a t a . = n . ( i = 1 , 2 ) . F o r o t h e r w i s e o n e o f t h e two p a r t i e s would h a v e a r e m a i n d e r ri h i g h enough i n t h e l i s t t o w a r r a n t a n e x t r a s e a t w h i l e r 1 + ' 2 > r l , r 2 i s n o t h i g h e n o u g h , w h i c h cann o t b e . I f r l = O t h e n a l = n l a n d a 2 = n2 o r a 2 = n 2 + 1 ; i n e i t h e r c a s e t h e c r i t e r i o n f o r s t a b i l i t y i s s a t i s f i e d .
I f b = n l + n 2 + 1, t h e n s i n c e a . = ni o r n . + 1 t h e r e i s n o t h i n g more t o show.
I f b = n l + n 2 + 2 , t h e n r l + r 2 > 1. S u p p o s e s t a b i l i t y i s n o t s a t i s f i e d , i -e . , t h a t a . = n . ( i = 1 , 2 ) .
1
Then f o r some p a r t y k # 1 , 2 , r l + r 2 -1 2 -r k w h i l e r l ( r k and r < r Thus 2 r k -1 2 r k a n d r k 2 1, a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 2 = k --N e x t , we show t h a t a b a l a n c e d h o u s e monotone method M i s -u n i f o r m i f a n d o n l y i f i t i s c o n s i s t e n t ( s e e ( 7 ) ) . F i r s t , assume t h a t M i s h o u s e monotone and c o n s i s t e n t .
The main t h e o r e m o f [ 4 ] s t a t e s t h a t t h i s i m p l i e s M i s a H u n t i n gt o n method b a s e d on some r a n k i n d e x r ( p , a ) . I f , i n a d d i t i o n , M i s b a l a n c e d t h e n r ( p , a -1 ) 2 r ( p , a ) and 2 i s a n M-apportion---ment i f and o n l y i f t h e min-max i n e q u a l i t y o f ( 5 ) i s s a t i s f i e d .
To p r o v e u n i f o r m i t y s u p p o s e t h a t ( a , b ) i s a n !-apportionment f o r --( p , ? ) a n d t h a t ( a t , b ' ) --i s o n e f o r ( p , c j t ) -w h e r e l . a . = Cia;, a # at. which establishes, by the test ( 5 ) , the desired result.
Second, assume that M is house monotone and uniform.
e ere .
it is not necessary to assume that M is balanced.) Consider two problems, (pl,p2,q) and (pllp2,q'), and suppose that the first has an M-apportionment (al,a2,b) and the second (al,a2,b'), -.
that the first has ac the next house the apportionment (al+l,a2 ,b) whereas the second has at the next house (al,a2+l,bt) , a seeming "switch" in priorities. Then, by uniformity, the first also has an apportionment (al,a2+l,b) and the second also has (al+l,a2,b), thus showing that there is a "tie" in priorities and that M is consistent.
